Unexpected Alliance: Kissinger, Albania, and the Shaping of China's UN Destiny

 

During the nuanced diplomatic maneuvers of the early 1970s, Albania played a distinctive and often overlooked role in facilitating People's Republic of China (PRC) accession to the United Nations (UN). This significant episode not only influenced the diplomatic dynamics of the time but also forged an unexpected indirect alliance with Henry Kissinger. Kissinger strategic goals regarding PRC aligned strategically but not timely with Albania's efforts to bring PRC into the UN, marking a pivotal moment in history.

Over the span of a decade, Albania's persistent diplomatic efforts played a crucial role in clearing the path for China's inclusion in the UN, a move that reshaped geopolitical dynamics forever. Simultaneously, the United States, under the leadership of Henry Kissinger, pursued a parallel diplomatic strategy with China, unbeknownst to Communist Albania, which viewed China as its primary ideological ally. In an intriguing twist of fate, both Albania and the US  shared the common goal of dismantling China's diplomatic isolation. Albania, standing out as a key facilitator in this historic process, held the belief that Communist China deserved a seat at the UN, a perspective that set it apart in a complex international landscape.

In that timeframe, Kissinger, discerned the potential benefits of establishing normalized relations with China. This shared perspective with Albania laid the groundwork for a diplomatic choreography meticulously designed to harmonize with the strategic objectives of both nations. Beyond symbolism, Albania's commitment extended to actively participating in diplomatic initiatives aimed at securing backing for China's admission to the UN. Acting as a conduit, Albania utilized its diplomatic ties to advocate for other nations to support PRC’s inclusion in the UN, thereby playing a substantive role in the process.

In July and August 1971, State Department officials struggled to secure the ROC’s acceptance of a plan allowing the PRC a UN seat alongside them, but their efforts were unsuccessful. Simultaneously, Kissinger, coordinating arrangements for a Presidential visit, emphasized no connection between his trip and the Chinese representation issue. But President Nixon, expressing pessimism about the ROC's future in the UN, suggested a delay, stating that "the time for Taiwan to go out is next year, it shouldn't go this year, it's not good for the Chinese”, he argued.

During a meeting with Chinese Prime Minister Chou Enlai on 21 October 1971, Kissinger expressed his candid opinion, arguing that the Albanian resolution at the UN should be postponed for another year to create a more favorable environment after the normalization of relations between the United States and PRC. He stated, "Actually, if I can speak candidly… it would be best for the policies which we discussed if the Albanian Resolution did not pass this year. In the latest public opinion poll, there are still 62% of the American people who are opposed to the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN", Kissinger would tell Chou Enlai.

On the afternoon of October 21, discussions between Chou and Kissinger centered on the United Nations issue. Chou, in a composed manner, affirmed the PRC’s opposition to the U.S. position, which avoided explicitly endorsing a two-China policy. Chou underscored the paramount importance of Taiwan's status to the PRC, asserting that they would abstain from UN participation if the U.S. position prevailed. Interestingly, he revealed the PRC's dissatisfaction with the Albanian Resolution, as it did not directly address the matter of Taiwan's status. Notably, during their final meeting, which coincided with the conclusion of the UN debate, Chou expressed discomfort, highlighting the diplomatic challenges posed by their discussions for PRC’s allies at the UN.

Chou Enlai sought to persuade Kissinger that support for the Albanian resolution at the United Nations was gaining momentum, even among U.S. allies. He aimed to convey that the current trajectory diverged from the U.S. expectation of establishing a Two-China policy, one that would maintain both PRC and ROC within the UN. Chou's argument emphasized the evolving international sentiment and the potential implications of the chosen path, highlighting a strategic misalignment between the perceived direction of U.S. policy and the unfolding diplomatic landscape at the UN around the Albanian resolution. 

During his visit to Beijing, Kissinger and Chou Enlai agreed on the key points later formalized in the Shanghai Communique, a diplomatic document issued on February 27, 1972. However, upon the plane's departure for home, Kissinger received news that the battle to preserve Taiwan's seat at the United Nations had been lost. Chou, aware of the vote before Kissinger's departure, chose not to be the first to inform him. Interestingly, during the visit, the Chinese did not seem optimistic about prevailing in that UN session, with Chou emphasizing that Taiwan's status held more significance for Beijing than UN membership. The vote occurred earlier than expected due to fewer nations choosing to speak, and despite efforts by UN Ambassador and later US President George Bush, the Albanian resolution was forced to a vote on October 25, 1971.

Hence, the Albanian resolution garnered overwhelming support, while the U.S. resolution advocating dual representation and a Security Council seat for Beijing, extensively shaped and promoted by the Washington, never reached a vote. Thus thw two-China model never came to reality as sought by Washington. The crux of the issue lay in the shift of stance by friendly nations to the US, many of whom had long grappled with the dilemma of balancing their desire not to antagonize the United States with their self-interest in garnering favor from powerful PRC. The fear of incurring penalties from the U.S. had restrained them from supporting the admission of the PRC. However, with the significant shift towards rapprochement with China, this fear dissipated, rendering the State Department's efforts to craft a "reasonable compromise" resolution futile. By supporting Peking's admission, other nations not only served their geopolitical interests but also found a means to appease their domestic left, especially if it seemed to defy the United States.

Upon his return on October 26, the atmosphere at the White House was tense, marked by internal disquiet. Some within the government sought to exploit Kissinger's visit to Beijing by leaking comments that held him responsible for the unfavorable outcome of the China vote. Simultaneously, President Nixon grew uneasy about the attention Kissinger was receiving, having chosen him for the July secret mission precisely because of his lower visibility and perceived easier control. The President was unwilling to be overshadowed by his own Assistant. The subtle maneuvers, such as the stopover in Alaska to avoid arriving on the day of the UN vote, suggested a tacit acknowledgment that Kissinger's trip was linked to the vote's outcome. Furthermore, disembarking at a remote corner of Andrews Air Force Base, away from journalists and photographers, underscored efforts to control the narrative and manage the political optics surrounding Kissinger's role in the diplomatic developments.

In his book on China, Albania’s Communist Leader, Enver Hoxha labeled China's actions towards the United States as a "significant opportunist mistake" that erred "in principle, strategy, and tactics."  According to Hoxha, China's warm reception of Kissinger, had the potential to sow confusion within the global revolutionary movement. 

This history primarily underscores the ideological naivety prevalent in communist Albania, exacerbated by its growing isolation and a failure to comprehend the profound changes occurring in international relations. In its earnest pursuit of bringing Communist China into the UN, Albania aspired to achieve a diplomatic victory that would elevate its influence within the communist world. Despite lacking the substantial resources and capabilities of major players like China, Yugoslavia, or the Soviet Union, as well as certain peripheral communist nations such as Poland, Romania, and East Germany, Albania harbored hopes of assuming a more prominent diplomatic role. The story highlights how Albania, ensnared in isolation, fostered illusions and a state of political naivety within the corridors of Tirana.

Paradoxically, as PRC secured entry into the United Nations with the support of Albania and other nations, their once-special and comradely relationship was unraveling, primarily driven by Beijing's rapprochement with the United States. This event bears importance as the Sino-Albanian alliance had played a pivotal role in PRC‘s quest for global revolution from 1963 to 1971. The dissolution of this alliance marked a significant consequence of PRC‘s shift towards embracing the United States. The convergence of Albania's diplomatic efforts and Kissinger's ambitions on PRC not only secured PRC‘s UN membership but also laid the groundwork for a new era of diplomatic engagement between major powers. 

Simultaneously, it illustrates two distinct approaches that positioned communist China as the victor. While Albania, influenced by the shifting dynamics favoring PRC due to Kissinger's secret diplomacy, lost a crucial ally by succeding with its resolution, it concurrently succeeded in removing one of the Washington’s key allies, Taiwan, from the UN, preventing forever US to achieve a two-China policy or a seat for Taiwan at the UN. Kissinger, through his diplomacy of rapprochement, and Albania, with its ideological approach, generated a global momentum that continues to wield significant influence on diplomatic relations today. Together, they brought a previously peripheral superpower into the forefront of international affairs.